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The management of multilingualism in the European Union (EU) has become
an increasingly debated issue. Some argue that ‘English as a lingua franca’
(ELF) should help solve many of the attendant challenges. The claim is
sometimes made that ELF, as a multilingual way of using English, is no longer
dependent upon the practices and representations of native speakers and
therefore poses no threat to linguistic diversity or to fairness. In this article, we
question the relevance of the concept of ELF from a language policy
perspective, showing that the socioeconomic implications of using ELF are no
different from those of using English only. We examine the costs associated
with alternative language regimes for the EU, showing that a reduction in the
direct costs of European multilingualism through the imposition of a single
language merely shifts costs towards citizens whose mother tongue is not
English, and that re-labelling it as ‘ELF’ makes no difference. The use of
translation and interpreting, though not free, remains more effective (and at a
reasonable cost) than a monolingual regime based on English alone; it also
more fair than a monolingual regime which unavoidably privileges native
speakers.
Keywords: English as a Lingua Franca, European Union, language policy
evaluation, multilingualism, language economics, EU language regime
La gestion du multilinguisme dans l’Union européenne (UE) fait l’objet d’un
débat de plus en plus vif. Pour certains, l’usage de ‘English as a lingua franca’
(ELF) devrait aider à résoudre plusieurs des défis liés à ce multilinguisme. Ils
affirment parfois qu’ELF, en tant qu’utilisation de l’anglais sur un mode
plurilingue, s’est affranchi des pratiques et représentations des locuteurs natifs;
par conséquent, il ne constituerait pas une menace pour la diversité
linguistique ou l’équité. Dans cet article, nous remettons en cause la pertinence
du concept même d’ELF d’un point de vue de politique linguistique. Nous
montrons que les effets socio-économiques de l’utilisation d’ELF ne diffèrent
pas de ceux qui découlent de l’usage exclusif de l’anglais. En analysant les
coûts liés à différents régimes linguistiques pour l’UE, nous montrons qu’une
réduction des coûts directs du multilinguisme européen au travers de
l’imposition d’une langue unique ne fait que reporter ces coûts sur les citoyens
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dont la première langue n’est pas l’anglais, et que le ré-étiquetage de l’anglais
comme «ELF» n’y change rien. Le recours à la traduction et à l’interprétation,
même s’il n’est pas gratuit, reste plus efficace, à un coût raisonnable, qu’un
régime monolingue basé sur la seule langue anglaise; il est aussi plus juste
qu’un régime monolingue qui, inévitablement, revient à privilégier les
locuteurs natifs.
Mots-clefs: Anglais comme lingua franca; Union européenne; évaluation des
politiques linguistiques; multilinguisme; économie des langues; régime
linguistique de l’UE
Setting the scene
The sustained interest in responses to the challenges of multilingual
communication in a highly diverse context such as that of European
institutions has led to the examination of several solutions and in-depth
discussions of their respective advantages and drawbacks.1 Of particular
interest to us are contributions like Pool (1996), Grin (2006, 2008), Gazzola
(2006), or Ginsburgh and Weber (2011), who adopt a policy analysis approach
designed for the systematic comparison of alternative language regimes with
the help of formal, established criteria of effectiveness and fairness (discussed
below). Some regimes are more complex than others because of the number of
languages used, the number of directions of translation and interpreting
required, the implied language learning needs for participants in
communication, or the functions for which various languages are used (or not
used). Comparisons between regimes in terms of effectiveness and fairness
allow us to identify and select regimes that offer the most attractive
combination of these two criteria.
Although it is quite straightforward to show (e.g. Pool 1991; 1996; Grin
2004b) that there is no such thing as an ‘obviously’ ideal solution, some
commentators confidently assert the superiority of a monolingual regime
using English alone (e.g. Cogo and Jenkins 2010, Van Parijs 2011). This
proposal comes in various looks and guises, but sometimes with the
admission that such a regime would, or at least could, entail a considerable
transfer of material and symbolic advantages to native speakers (NS) of the
language chosen – native Anglophones, if this language is English. The
existence of such transfers would of course constitute a serious argument
against a regime of English unilingualism, because such a regime,
independently of the dubious character of its claims to effectiveness (a point
we address later on in this article), would be downright unfair. On this latter
point, van Parijs’s contention (presented in a succession of articles and
synthesised in van Parijs, 2011) that ‘linguistic justice’ would be well served by
an English-only regime has been refuted by Grin (2004a), Barbier (2012) and
Phillipson (2012). Perhaps in order to deflect some of this criticism, some
scholars have suggested that the English used in international communication
is not English at all, but something fundamentally different called ‘English as
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a lingua franca’ (henceforth: ELF). The first question to examine, therefore, is
whether ELF makes a genuine difference to multilingual communication,
including resort to translation.
Language regimes: does ELF differ from English?
The literature on ELF (e.g. House 2003; Seidlhofer, Breiteneder, and Pitzl
2006, Cogo and Jenkins 2010, Hülmbauer and Seidlhofer forthcoming) is more
explicit on what ELF is not than on what it is. The same elusiveness of
the concept transpires in work by outside observers who have attempted
to clarify the nature and implications of ELF, for example in a survey of
the question published by the EC’s Directorate-General for Translation
(European Commission, 2011), or a review article by Formentelli (2012).
However, clarifying the nature of ELF is of crucial importance if policy
recommendations regarding its use in EU activities and education systems
must be made.
In early definitions (e.g. Firth 2006: 240), ELF is presented as “a ‘contact
language’ between persons who share neither a common native tongue nor a
common (national) culture, and for whom English is the chosen foreign
language of communication”. So far, so good: the reference clearly is to
‘English’ – but then, this leaves an English-based regime exposed to the
criticism that it entails inequality of treatment among citizens, and it does not
solve the problem of which written form should be used for official purposes.
Most ELF advocates then proceed to another argument, which is to suggest
that ELF is not so much a language as a situation (occasionally a ‘context of use’)
in which a language (in this case: English) is used. The problem, then, is what
situations should be considered as ‘ELF’, and it is unclear how ‘ELF-ish’ an
interaction remains when it involves native speakers. House (2003: 558) insists,
in a rather convoluted way, that “a lingua franca speaker is not per definitionem
not fully competent in the part of his/her linguistic knowledge under study”.
This apparently means that a lingua franca user (say, a native speaker of
Swedish who has spent a few years in the United States and uses English with
non-speakers of Swedish) may be perfectly fluent in English. But then this may
be true of his interlocutor, say, a native speaker of Spanish who has spent
several years studying in Oxford. In fact, if they are ‘not not fully competent’
(that is, allowing that they may be ‘fully competent’), their speech could be, in
a limiting case, almost indistinguishable from that of native speakers of
English. One fails to see why we need a label such as ‘ELF’ as distinct from
‘English’ to describe the code they use. The matter becomes even more
perplexing if a third participant (say, an Irish member of the European
Parliament whose native language is English) joins the conversation.
Departures from native-speaker standard listed by ELF specialists as
typical manifestations of ELF, though linguistically intriguing, turn out to be
rather anecdotal (see e.g. Seidlhofer et al. 2006), and could perfectly well be
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explained from an EFL (‘English as a foreign language’) standpoint (see
Formentelli, 2012 for a discussion), which makes allowance for the possibility
that non-standard forms may become entrenched in the usage of individuals
or groups. However, another problem then arises, since ELF advocates insist
that despite the fact that a set of morphosyntactic and phonological traits is
assigned to it, ELF is not a variety of English.
Since corpus (or corpus-related) arguments prove problematic, more
sociolinguistic arguments are sometimes invoked, using the notion of
‘ownership’. English, it is claimed, is no longer ‘owned’ by native speakers of
the language when used as a lingua franca, and is being appropriated and
changed by non-native users. This process allegedly deprives native speakers
of any privilege, because non-standard forms are spreading (House 2003;
Jenkins 2007). This claim, however, remains unconvincing because the notion
of ‘ownership’ referred to is a purely metaphorical one, and the logical
implications of this metaphor are never spelled out. Quite simply, nobody
‘owns’ a language. What one may ‘own’, stretching things a little, is
competence in a language, which is akin to a form of capital generating
material and symbolic services. Such services may be bought and sold, as
when a native speaker of English sells private language tuition to Koreans who
want to learn the language. The (successful) Korean learners may then develop
a sense of familiarity with the English language and feel self-confident when
using it, to the point, presented by ELF advocates as an objective, where they
feel under no obligation to emulate native speaker usage. This might be a
welcome victory over linguistic insecurity, but it has nothing to do with
‘ownership’ and its social, political and economic import is negligible.
Moreover, labour market rewards to the knowledge of English rise with
the level of skills judged to be in conformity with native speaker norm – a
result amply documented by econometric proof in the language economics
literature (see e.g. Grin 2001). In other words, such benefits are more easily
accessed with a command of a standard version of the language – preferably
closer to native-speaker syntax and intonation.
A related criticism comes from translation studies. Translators can be seen,
in a sense, as the ultimate language specialists, who happen to be confronted
with real actors’ demand for reliable translations. The ELF discourse proposes
no answer to the problems of reliability in translation that unavoidably arise
along with the ELF project (Hewson 2009). This indirectly points to another
problematic aspect of the ELF project, namely, its implicit conflation of
‘communication’ with ‘oral communication’. However, much communication
is written instead of oral, especially in professional settings such as an
international firm or a supranational organisation, and the development of
new technologies of information and communication reinforces the
importance of the written word. It is far from certain that conformity to
standard usage can be ignored as breezily in written communication.2
It follows that English as a foreign language (let us emphasise: not ELF,
but English, by and large following some native speaker norm), is where the
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demand goes. The unequal distribution of language learning effort that
linguistic hegemony implies remains unaffected: non-native speakers of
English learn English, and many Anglophones, understandably, do not see
much point in learning foreign languages, particularly if this effort has to
be pushed to a certain level. Native speakers of English can take courses
where they learn to speak their native language ‘exolingually’, that is, with
non-native interlocutors in mind. This may require them, for example, to
avoid colloquialisms or arcane cultural references. Such courses, however,
typically take a few hours, a far cry from the thousands of hours of
learning and practice required for a non-native speaker of English to
achieve some degree of fluency in the language. It follows that yet another
attempt at defining ELF, namely, as “an additionally acquired language
system which serves as a common means of communication for speakers
of different first languages” (from the Vienna-Oxford International Corpus
of English, quoted in Cogo and Jenkins 2010) rings hollow, because the
actual process of “additional language system acquisition” by native
speakers of English mainly boils down to developing an awareness of the
need to avoid, in some interactional contexts, non-transparent colloquialisms
or prosody.3
As Fiedler observes (2010: 212),
the fact that ELF is not a genuine lingua franca is also the reason why some
of the factors hindering equality in international communication will not
be removed by the [ELF] model. [. . .] ELF is still a variety of English
providing English-speaking countries enormous additional income [. . .].
The ELF model might alleviate the economic inequality slightly, [. . .], but
it will not fundamentally change the situation as English as a lingua franca
is still English.
Obviously, all this has nothing to do with the English language as such. The
real issues at hand have to do with power, and they would be similar if the
internationally hegemonic language were Dutch, Farsi or Efik.
One of the uses of a policy analysis approach is to identify and measure the
distributional impacts of alternative policy scenarios, including comparisons
between language regimes that rely on the learning of one language by all
non-native speakers of it, and regimes that require less language learning but
use more translation and interpreting. It is in the rigorous comparison
between the allocative and distributive effects of alternative regimes that the
real social and policy questions lie, and we shall examine them in the rest of
this article, having made clear that once some ambiguities are lifted, the
concept of ‘ELF’ is of modest policy relevance, particularly for the EU’s
language regime. To all intents and purposes, ‘ELF’ means ‘English’, despite
attempts to portray it as something different, and we shall henceforth refer to
English, even if used by non-native speakers, or by native and non-native
speakers interacting with each other.
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The evaluation of language regimes: theoretical issues
In policy evaluation, alternative scenarios are compared and evaluated on the
basis of some fundamental criteria, such as effectiveness and fairness.4
Evaluating effectiveness implies assessing the results of a policy (or
outcomes), by clarifying to what extent policy objectives have been achieved
(or are expected to be achieved in an ex ante evaluation). Assessing fairness
implies identifying who loses, who gains, and (if possible) how much, and
how the costs of alternative policies are shared among individuals or groups.
Thus, there is no moral or ethical content in the technical concept of ‘fairness’
in policy analysis (e.g. Just, Hueth, and Schmitz 2004), and the fairness of
language policies is approached in terms of the distributive effects of
alternative language policies on the actors concerned (for example, European
citizens who wish to communicate with EU institutions).
Effectiveness
Policy evaluation criteria must be adapted to the needs of language policy and
planning (LPP). Building on earlier theoretical models, Gazzola and Grin
(2007) and Gazzola (2011) design a general framework to evaluate language
policies on the basis of policy analysis, focusing on the management of
multilingual communication in linguistically diverse organisations such as the
EU. The effectiveness of a language policy is assessed in terms of its capacity
to ensure effective communication, that is, a way of handling multilingual
communication that positively affects the effectiveness of the organisation
analysed in achieving its goals. For example, the effectiveness of language
policies in multilingual patent organisations must be assessed with respect to
the goals of these institutions, namely, the promotion of innovation and the
orderly sharing of technical knowledge. Likewise, the effectiveness of the
language regime of the EU must be assessed in relation to goals considered
relevant for the Union, such as the democratic participation of European
citizens in EU affairs. The approach does not require any a priori definition of
what these goals are; they must be identified in each case by observing the
type of activities carried out by a given organisation.
The effectiveness criterion must then be operationalised through
appropriate indicators. The function of these indicators is to reflect the
effectiveness of a language policy in achieving its objectives. It is important to
note that the rationale for effectiveness indicators is not to ‘measure’ or
‘quantify’ communication, nor to assess whether a specific language policy is
effective per se. The function of indicators is to help decision makers in
comparing how effectiveness changes if we move from a more (respectively,
less) multilingual policy to less (more) multilingual policy, for example if the
EU shifts from a language regime comprising 23 official languages to an
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English-centred language policy. An example of such indicator is discussed
below.
Fairness
Let us turn to fairness or distributive justice (the two terms are generally used
as equivalent in economics and policy evaluation). The analysis of the
distributive effects of language policies must be part of a fully-fledged
evaluation, as an effective policy may be rejected if its distributive
consequences are deemed unfair by society. In the specialist literature, the
concept of fairness in LPP is sometimes called ‘linguistic justice’, and it is the
object of a growing literature (e.g. Pool 1991; Grin 2005, 2008; De Schutter
2007, Wickström 2007, Fiedler 2010, Van Parijs 2011, Gazzola 2011).
Evaluating the distributive consequences of language policies requires
three steps (Gazzola and Grin 2007), that is: (i) defining the groups concerned
– typically, these groups are identified on the basis of the first language (or
‘mother tongue’) of its members; (ii) identifying the channels through which
distribution of resources occurs; and (iii) if possible, providing a quantitative
estimation of the magnitude of these distributional effects.
Costs
Most of the literature dealing with the costs of multilingualism in
international organisations focuses on outlays for translation and interpreting.
These costs are obviously important, but the types of costs that must be taken
into account in an evaluation are larger. Three types of costs associated with
language regimes can be identified, that is, primary, secondary, and implicit
costs (Gazzola 2011).
Primary costs can be defined as the sum of direct costs of translation and
interpreting services (staff) and indirect costs, such as overheads, associated
with language services. Costs for outsourced language services are part of
primary costs if they are included in the budget of the organisation
considered. Secondary costs include a broad class of costs associated with
linguistic diversity in multilingual organisations, including possible
misunderstandings, delays or errors due to translation and interpreting (or
due to the process of information circulation that precedes or follows
translation or interpreting proper). Secondary costs can also arise if the
organisation adopts a restricted number of languages (or only one) for its
internal communication. The reduced productivity of staff due to lack of
language skills (both productive and receptive) or the mental fatigue caused
by working in a foreign language are examples of such secondary costs. For a
systematic comparison of policy scenarios, secondary costs ought to be
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expressed in monetary form, but in practice it may be very difficult to estimate
them.
Let us now turn to implicit costs. Authors sometimes use the terms
‘adjustment costs’, (Vaillancourt and Coche 2009) or ‘adoption price’ (Pool
1991). Implicit costs can be defined as costs borne by natural or legal persons
(or ‘agents’ or ‘actors’) who cannot interact in their first language with a public
authority, for example, the EU or an international trademark office, because it
is not included in the set of the official languages of the organisation
considered. Examples of implicit costs are translations and interpreting costs
from or into one of the organisation’s official languages borne by agents, time
devoted to learning official languages, effort, learning costs (teachers and
learning material), and the opportunity cost of resources used for language
learning and translations. Implicit costs also include items that are difficult to
quantify, such as alienation and the psychological costs linked to loss of
prestige of languages that are not acknowledged as official languages. Hence,
the notions of implicit cost and language policy evaluation are perfectly
compatible with paying proper attention to the symbolic dimensions of
language. An in-depth evaluation of the costs of language policies, therefore,
should not be limited to primary and secondary costs but should also include
an assessment of implicit costs.
Analysis and conclusions: costs, effectiveness and fairness of
the EU language regime
EU institutions currently spend around €1.1 billion per year on language
services,5 that is, less than 1% of the budget of EU institutions (€147.2 billion in
2012) and 0.0087% of European GDP (€12,784.1 billion in 2012). As the EU’s
population in 2012 was about 503.7 million, the annual per-person expenditure
for the current EU language regime can be estimated at €2.2 (€1.7 for
translation and €0.5 for interpreting). Suppose however that the cost is spread
only over citizens aged 15 or above, on the grounds that a language regime
mainly serves people old enough to read and write. Given that the population
aged 15 or over was about 408.9 million in 2012 (see Table 1), the annual
per-person expenditure for the current EU language regime can be estimated
at €2.7. Hence, claiming that the language regime of the EU after the last two
enlargements “has become economically unsustainable” (Cogo and Jenkins
2010: 272) is, from an economic point of view, meaningless. Something that
costs 0.0087% of aggregate income cannot be defined as economically
unsustainable. The real question is how much EU citizens are willing to pay for
translation and interpreting services, and €2.20 per year does not seem a
prohibitive price. Unfortunately, no figures for secondary costs are available,
and for the purposes of this article, we focus on primary costs.
Let us now turn to the measurement of effectiveness, which requires
moving from concepts to quantifiable indicators and therefore
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Table 1. Language skills in English among EU citizens aged 15 or over, 2012
Country Population >
15
Level of competence in
English as a foreign language
Total
(%)
Very
good (%)
Good
(%)
Basic
(%)
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)a
Belgium 8,939,546 14 24 15 52
Bulgaria 6,537,510 7 13 5 25
Czech Republic 9,012,443 8 16 4 27
Denmark 4,561,264 38 34 15 86
Germany 64,409,146 9 26 21 56
Estonia 945,733 9 27 14 50
Ireland 3,522,000 NS NS NS 100
Greece 8,693,566 19 19 13 51
Spain 39,127,930 3 11 9 22
France 47,756,439 3 16 20 39
Italy 51,862,391 4 21 8 34
Cyprus 660,400 31 31 12 73
Latvia 1,447,866 7 18 20 46
Lithuania 2,829,740 5 17 15 38
Luxembourg 404,907 18 27 10 56
Hungary 8,320,614 4 7 8 20
Malta 335,476 46 30 12 89
Netherlands 13,371,980 28 52 10 90
Austria 7,009,827 15 31 26 73
Poland 32,413,735 7 15 11 33
Portugal 8,080,915 2 13 11 27
Romania 18,246,731 7 14 10 31
Slovenia 1,759,701 17 25 18 59
Slovakia 4,549,955 7 14 5 26
Finland 4,440,004 18 25 27 70
Sweden 7,791,240 34 34 18 86
United Kingdom 51,848,010 NS NS NS 100
Total 408,879,069 50
Percentage of EU
citizens who speak
English as a foreign
language, by level
of competence
7 17 12 37
Note: aFor some countries the sum of percentages for columns (b), (c) and (d) is not
equal to 100% because of missing answers.
Source: Calculations by the authors using ﬁgures provided in European Commission
(2012).
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operationalising the concept of effectiveness (or ‘effective communication’).
The European Commission publishes statistics on language learning in the
European education systems, and some survey data concerning the use and
knowledge of foreign languages in Europe. In 2001, 2006 and 2012, for
example, three Eurobarometer surveys have been published, with
demolinguistic data on European citizens’ native languages and their skills in
foreign languages, but this does not yet amount to a full-fledged indicator
system.
This does not mean, however, that no evaluation can be carried out. If ideal
data are not available, we can use proxy indicators that are less precise but
easier to populate. In this article, we use an indicator of effectiveness
reflecting one of the goals of the EU, namely, allowing the democratic
participation of European citizens in EU affairs, that is, the percentage of EU
citizens who can potentially have full access to the content of EU documents
such as legally binding texts and/or to debates at plenary meetings of the
European Parliament.6
The current language regime makes it possible for all EU citizens to have
full access to the content of EU documents such as body of legal texts, and to
public debates at the European Parliament (e.g. on the Internet). Would that be
the case if English were adopted as the only official language of the EU? To
answer this question, we need to look at the English-language skills of EU
citizens. Table 1 summarises some of the results of the latest Eurobarometer
survey on the language skills of European citizens. Data refer to 2012 and have
been collected on a random and statistically representative sample of
respondents aged 15 or older (European Commission 2012).
Column (a) shows the population of the 27 EU countries aged 15 or
older. Columns (b) to (d) show the percentage of respondents who declare
knowledge of English as a foreign language, by level of self-reported
competence (‘very good’, ‘good’ or ‘basic’). The Eurobarometer data provide
self-reported competence levels, without any further definition beyond the
condition that respondents must have first declared that they speak English
“well enough in order to be able to have a conversation”. For example, 14%
of Belgians report a ‘very good’ command of English.7 Column (e) shows
the total percentage of the population who declares being able to speak
English “well enough in order to be able to have a conversation, excluding
[their] mother tongue”. To assess the effectiveness of the EU language
regime, however, we must include the native speakers of English. For
simplicity, we have set this percentage for the United Kingdom and Ireland
at 100%.8
Summing up (and rounding figures to the nearest integer), 50% of EU
citizens aged 15 or more do not speak English (either as native or foreign
language). Native speakers of English represent 14% of the EU population;
non-native speakers make up 37% of the population. With respect to the total
EU population, only 7% of EU citizens report having a ‘very good’ level of
English as a foreign language, 17% a ‘good’ level, and 12% a ‘basic’ level
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(these percentages are respectively, 8%, 20% and 14% if we exclude European
countries where English is an official language). This indicator shows that
fluency in English in Europe simply is not a universal ‘basic skill’.
Thus, if we focus on external communication and if we measure
effectiveness as the percentage of EU citizens who can have full access to the
content of general EU documents and debates at the EP, the current
multilingual language regime resorting to translation and interpreting is
clearly more effective than an English-based language regime. If English were
declared the exclusive official language of the EU, as suggested by Cogo and
Jenkins (2010) and Van Parijs (2011), only 14% of EU citizens (that is, native
speakers) would have full access to EU documents and debates at the
European Parliament without having had to go through a major foreign
language learning effort, and half of the EU population would have no access
at all to EU debates or documents. Even if we assume that citizens with a ‘very
good’ command of English can be likened to native speakers, and that they
can read EU documents and follow debates in English with no more learning
effort than native speakers, then the effectiveness indicator would be in the
region of 21% (14% + 7%) of EU citizens. This is very, very far from
‘effectiveness’ of any description.
One might of course argue that a ‘good’ level is enough to read to EU
documents and follow public sessions of the European Parliament. In this
case, the effectiveness indicator used would climb to 38%. It is risky, in the
absence of any further information, to venture estimations regarding the level
of self-reported language skills. However, it seems rather unlikely that
citizens declaring a ‘good’ knowledge of English would have a full access to
documents or debates in English, let alone at the same level of comfort and
ease as native speakers and (maybe) non-native speakers with a ‘very good’
knowledge.
Let us now turn to costs. The primary costs of a hypothetical English-only
language regime (set up in accordance with the recommendations of
commentators like Van Parijs or Cogo and Jenkins) are likely to be lower than
the current ones. However, these primary costs are not zero, as some text
editing, as well as some translation and interpreting for specific purposes,
would remain necessary. Even if non-native speaker civil servants and
politicians may have a very good command of English, it is unlikely that the
EU would not need to employ native speakers of English to make a
substantial quality check of legally binding documents. As regards the
European Parliament, a regime based on asymmetric interpreting – that is, a
regime in which speakers who do not use English are interpreted only into
English and no interpreting from English into other languages is provided –
would probably be necessary, at least during a transition period, for Members
of the European Parliament (MEPs) who cannot express themselves in
English.9
However, an English-centred language regime would clearly entail an
increase in the implicit costs borne by 86% of EU citizens. Today, the primary
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cost of the EU’s language regime is equal to €2.20 per person. If English were
the only official and working language of the EU, non-native speakers would
obviously spend, on average, much more than €2.20 per year on translation,
interpreting or language learning to access to EU communication. This
expense, of course, does not include the symbolic costs linked to general
downgrading and loss of status of their respective languages.
Hence, an English-centred language regime would not only be less
effective than the current one. It would also probably be much more
expensive, once its implicit costs are duly taken into account, as they should
be for any proper comparison of costs. In other words, reducing the primary
costs of European multilingualism through an English-centred language
regime would essentially amount to a shifting of costs to those European
citizens whose native language is not English.
Finally, as regards fairness, the adoption of such a regime would entail
substantial distributive effects among EU citizens, precisely because the
knowledge of English is not evenly distributed among them. Residents in the
UK and Ireland, on average, would have better access to EU documents than
any other EU citizens, and considerable differences also exist between other
countries. Table 1 shows that knowledge of English is more common in
countries such as Malta, the Netherlands or Sweden than in Bulgaria,
Hungary or Spain. The current multilingual language regime, at least for
external communication, does not entail such distributive effects among
European citizens.
The conclusion naturally follows: a multilingual, translation-based
language regime is both more effective and more fair than a unilingual regime
based on English – even if it is dressed up as “ELF”.
Notes
1. See, among others, Phillipson (2003), Gazzola (2006), Grin (2006), Castiglione and
Longman (2007), Arzoz (2008), Van Parijs (2011), Ginsburgh and Weber (2011). For
a description of the EU language regime, see Phillipson (2003), Gazzola (2006),
Athanassiou (2006) and Nißl (2011).
2. Incidentally, it is telling that the editors of this journal require articles to be
proofread by native speakers of English before submission.
3. On this matter, see the interesting testimony in the Financial Times: “Why proper
English rules OK. Of course native speakers of English aren’t more intelligent than
foreigners. But in a ‘Globish’ world they sound it”, Simon Kuper, October 8, 2010.
4. For reasons of space, we do not discuss here other important criteria such as
relevance, efficiency and cost-effectiveness (Gazzola 2011).
5. Personal communication from the spokesperson of the EU Commissioner for
Education, Culture, Multilingualism and Youth. See estimations for 2006–07 in
Gazzola (2006).
6. This indicator is close to the indicator used by Ginsburgh and Weber’s (2011) in their
‘disenfranchisement’ approach.
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7. In the 2012 survey, for the first time, respondents were asked which foreign
languages they understood ‘well enough’ to read newspapers or magazine articles
or to follow the news on the radio or television. Twenty five per cent of Europeans
declare understanding English as a foreign language well enough to carry out these
activities. This information can be useful to evaluate the EU language regime, as it
provides new insights on the receptive (or ‘passive’) linguistic skills of Europeans.
However, we have no figures on the level of knowledge. Our evaluation, therefore,
is based on data on productive (or ‘active’) skills, as they are more precise.
8. Ninety three per cent of the Irish and 88% of the British declare English as their
native language. In Ireland, 3% of the population declare Irish as their native
language. However, these respondents have often received much of their education
through English and therefore, for the purposes of this article, they are included
among native speakers. In the United Kingdom and Ireland, 2% of residents declare
Polish as their native language, and the percentage of British residents declaring
other native languages, including Scottish Gaelic and Welsh, is always below 1%
(with the exception of French, German and Portuguese spoken by 1% of the
residents as mother tongues). However, no data is available regarding the language
in which these persons have been educated or the level of proficiency in English
acquired after a (presumably) long stay in the country. Thus, by setting at 100% the
number of native speakers in the UK and Ireland, we slightly overestimate the
number of native speakers (and thus the number of persons fluent in English). Our
estimates, therefore, must be seen as an upper bound.
9. The troubling implication is that following this transition period, European citizens
could only be eligible to Parliament if they demonstrate high fluency in English.
Such a requirement, of course, is plainly incompatible with the workings of a
democratic system.
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